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Abstract 
The belief that groundwater in rural areas is best managed according to the 
Community Based Management (CBM) model is the dominant paradigm across Sub-
Saharan Africa.  While donors and governments focus on extending the supply 
network to meet the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of universal 
access to clean water, at any one time a third of handpumps are non-functional. 
Basing our case on ethnographic fieldwork, surveys and interviews, and working 
closely with policy implementers over the course of three years in mid-west Uganda, 
we argue that non-functionality of handpumps, and the precarious status of many, 
cannot be blamed solely on poor technology or siting of wells:  rather the problem 
stems from a dearth of maintenance funds and management failings. The CBM model 
is an uneasy coalition of ideologies from across the political spectrum that meshes 
neo-liberal inspired commodification with theories of collective action and Common 
Property Resources. We demonstrate conceptually and empirically how the wings of 
the CBM model individually and collectively are contributing to the disappointing 
outcomes amid the messy complex reality of rural environments. Recommendations 
calling for modifying participatory processes, technological solutions and more 
external support all fall within the existing CBM framework, which we will 
empirically demonstrate is a blueprint for breakdown in these contexts. A resolution 
to the financing of handpump maintenance must be found if the SDG is to be realised, 
and we argue that academics, policy makers and practitioners need to accept this may 
lie outside the CBM paradigm.  
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this article is to examine the underlying ideologies and theoretical 
underpinnings of the Community Based Management (CBM) model – the dominant 
paradigm in rural water management in sub-Saharan Africa – and the resultant 
disappointing outcomes across two decades.  
 
By the 1990s, it was broadly acknowledged recognised that the top-down state-led 
paradigm for water provision had largely ignored and ultimately failed rural 
communities across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Harvey and 
Reed, 2006; Le Gouais and Wach, 2013; Moriarty et al., 2013; Miller, 1980; Parry-
Jones et al., 2001). Where provision was made by the state, the expectation of 
beneficiaries was that access should be free and maintenance not their responsibility–
–a mindset that largely persists into the present time (Jones, 2011; Quin et al.,2011; 
Whittington et al., 2009, Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Woolcock and Prichett, 2004). To 
combat the acknowledged poor provision in rural areas,
1
and as a route to more 
sustainable access to water in developing countries, the CBM model was promoted 
and promulgated in rural areas, whereby communities demand a water service, decide 
the technology, contribute towards the construction, voluntarily manage the water 
source and pay for its upkeep (Briscoe and Ferranti, 1988). We argue that the CBM 
model is a paradoxical ideological amalgam of grassroots post-Marxist 
developmentalists: the ‘new’ Left on the one hand, and on the other, neo-liberals, the 
‘new’ Right. Both promote the rolling back of the state, more local control and self-
reliance (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Both advocate collective action, the former in the 
absence of trust in African politicians and government agencies (Page, 2003) and the 
private sector (Shiva, 2002), the latter in order to cut state deficits by promoting the 
commodification of water, thereby ensuring the community covers Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) costs (Blaikie, 2006). The CBM model is a paradigm of its era 
(1990s) when there was faith in so-called Third Way politics and policy programmes 
that promised win-win outcomes (Mohan, 2002). Because support comes from both 
ends of the political spectrum, the CBM model has proved very dominant and to date 
the prevailing view of donor agencies, policy makers and academics in the rural water 
circle is “that communities can and should take full responsibility for their [water] 
systems” (Whittington et al., 2009 p. 714).  
At any one time, however, one out of three handpumps is non-functional across SSA 
(Baumann 2006; Oxford/RFL, 2014; RWSN, 2010). Statistics for non-functionality of 
handpumps are no better than they were in the state-led era (Evans, 1992) – 
maintenance has been, and continues to be, the stumbling block. The magnitude of the 
challenge is evident when in five years’ time it is estimated that 57% of the global 
population will be dependent on communally-managed water points (Joint Monitoring 
                                                             
1
 22% of rural populations had access to an improved water source in 1980 compared with 66% of their 
urban counterparts (WHO, 1992). 
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Program, 2011), further exacerbated by growing populations and the often detrimental 
impact of climate change (Oates et al., 2014; Schlosser et al., 2014).  
We investigate how the CBM model is interpreted and implemented in Uganda.  
Through original and rigorous ethnographic fieldwork, surveys and interviews (across 
a total of 107 unique water points – 95 were constructed by a local NGO with whom 
we had strong links, the remaining twelve were constructed by the local government) 
we analyse the outcomes of community-managed rural groundwater points in mid-
west Uganda.  
Our findings lend support to a body of empirical study that is beginning to show that 
the problem of handpump non-functionality is fundamentally related to the CBM 
model (Barnes et al., 2014; Baumann and Furey, 2013; Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 
2010; Jones, 2011), more specifically the dearth of collected funds for O&M (Burr 
and Fonseca, 2013; Jones, 2011). There is a reluctance amongst academics and 
practitioners to challenge the CBM model (see Blaikie, 2006 p.1944) – rather, 
deliverance is sought within the existing paradigm in calls for tweaking the 
participatory processes, offering technological solutions and more external support. 
This is where our study diverges – we demonstrate that there is a fundamental 
mismatch within the framework that attempts to mesh the commodification of water 
with collective action amid the messy complex reality of rural environments. We then 
offer insights into why recommendations for improvements that fall within the CBM 
paradigm will struggle to succeed. In so doing we make a contribution to academic 
and practitioner debates and the growing geography of water literature. 
The paper proceeds with a review of the literature on the CBM model and its 
conceptual underpinnings, followed by a summary of the recommendations offered in 
the literature to shore up the model. This is followed by our case study on the 
implementation of rural water projects and the status of community-managed rural 
water points in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts in Uganda, with a discussion and 
conclusion to close.  
 
 
2. The Community Based Management model for rural water management 
The CBM model comprises two phases, the first of which is referred to as the 
Demand Responsive Approach (DRA) (Sarah and Katz, 1998). This encourages 
communities to demand a service, decide the technology, contribute towards the 
construction and form a local institution – a Water User Committee (WUC) – to 
manage the water source (Breslin, 2003). The second and ongoing phase is post-
construction where the elected WUC voluntarily oversees O&M of the water source 
and collects the fees from users (Lockwood, 2004). It is through these two stages that 
sustainability is envisaged, embracing participation from the outset with the resultant 
empowerment and sense of ownership combining to ensure the community is willing 
to pay and volunteer their time to keep the system running (Doe and Khan, 2004).   
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The CBM model is an uneasy coalition of ideologies that mesh theories from opposite 
ends of the political spectrum. We argue that each wing of the model rests on some 
rather tenuous assumptions about human behaviour.  The grassroots arm of the CBM 
model draws upon theories of collective action and Common Property Resources 
(CPR), and is committed to positive notions of community, participation, social 
capital and self-regulating local water institutions. 
 
A practitioner handbook on “managing natural resources for development in Africa” 
describes a community as: “[a] group of people bounded by geographical links, such 
as a village, settlement or district, politics or natural boundaries but also includes 
those brought together by lifestyle, culture, religion, hobby and interest” (Wasonga et 
al., 2010 p. 167). However, such conceptualisations of African community are 
problematic (Cleaver, 1999; 2001). The World Bank (2010) notes that substantial 
changes are taking place in rural areas due to increased employment, 
communications, wealth and individualism. Neither are communities necessarily 
homogenous as Harvey and Reed (2006) and Lockwood (2004) point out: no two 
rural communities are the same and differences also exist within communities caused 
by wealth, gender, ethnicity or religion. Finally, communities are often far from 
harmonious, and the concept “conceals power relations” and “masks biases in 
interests and needs” (Guijt and Shah, 1998 cited in Cooke and Kothari, 2001 p.6). 
Cleaver (1999) takes it a step further and declares ‘community’ a “myth” (p. 603). 
 
If communities do not live up to their populist cohesive image, then their willingness 
to participate cannot be taken for granted. The decision to participate or not may be a 
rational or an unconscious choice, embedded in social norms (Cleaver, 2001), and is 
dependent on age, gender and class (Holmes and Scoones, 2000). Participation often 
benefits elites (Brown, 2013; van Koppen et al., 2012), thus challenging the belief that 
it is an indisputable good (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Further, it is probably 
unrealistic to expect a representation of all water users in the design, implementation 
and post-construction phases of water schemes.  Nevertheless, it appears that water 
practitioners have embraced the “cultural idealisation of rural communities” (Harvey 
and Reed, 2006 cited in Moriarty et al., 2013 p. 331).   
 
Participation during the implementation stages of a rural water project is perceived to 
increase the stock of social capital amongst water users (Narayan, 1995). This is 
invariably viewed as a positive community characteristic
2
, which will enhance a 
community’s ability to act collectively and ultimately manage a water source 
sustainably (Bisung and Elliott, 2014; Bisung et al., 2014; Krishna and Uphoff, 2002).  
 
                                                             
2 Features such as interpersonal trust, norms of reciprocity and mutual aid that bind a group together 
are a gauge of the stock of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam 1993, 2000). 
   
 
 5 
The establishment of self-regulating institutions is central to the CBM model (Mosse, 
2006), and is strongly influenced by Common Property Resource theory and the work 
of Elinor Ostrom and her eight design principles (Table 1) (1990, 1998, 2000). 
Individuals participate in collective action and develop institutions to govern their 
behaviour in order to benefit from “productive outcomes in situations where 
temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present” (Ostrom, 1990 p.29). Similarly, 
North (1990) claims institutions reduce uncertainty and propel collective action. For 
development practitioners, the formation of local institutions is attractive as they 
represent a tangible embodiment of an idealised notion of ‘community’ (Mosse, 
2006), undertaking visible collective action, where rules are developed and executed 
(Ostrom, 1990) and are easy to influence, amend and analyse (Scott 1998, in Cooke 
and Kothari, 2001). Cleaver (1999), however, asserts that actual water management is 
“embedded in social networks, daily interactions and the application of social norms” 
that may lie outside formal institutional arrangements (p. 602). 
 
Table 1 
Ostrom’s design principles (1990, p. 90). 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be 
clearly defined, as must the boundary of the CPR itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are 
related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational 
rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively, audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to 
the appropriators or are the appropriators.  
5. Graduate sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions 
(depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials 
accountable to these appropriators, or by both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts 
among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external 
governmental authorities. 
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities, are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises.  
 
Ultimately, how effectively communities undertake collective action depends on 
formal and informal relationships that: (1) restrain water users from free-riding, (2) 
motivate people to participate in the management of the water source, and (3) aid 
water users to craft and enforce rules that govern the water system in the village 
(Kähkönen, 1999). The challenge in Uganda lies in whether Ostrom’s (1990) success 
stories of long-standing communally managed fisheries, forest and canal irrigation 
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schemes can be duplicated for communally managed water points.  There is no 
certainty that these isolated small-scale examples of organic collective action can be 
scaled-up through the imposition to comply with government policy (Mansuri and 
Rao, 2013 p.33).  
 
The other arm of the CBM model, influenced by neo-liberal agendas, is the 
acceptance that water should be treated as a commodity and paid for. Instrumental 
were the 1992 Dublin Principles where governments and the international donor 
community declared water as an economic good and agreed that water should be 
managed at the lowest possible level (Sara and Katz, 1998).  To begin with, we must 
clarify what ‘goods’ and ‘services’ are being commodified under the CBM model. 
While groundwater (the ‘goods’) is untreated, capital and labour investments must be 
supplied and financed in order to initially access the resource through the construction 
of boreholes and Shallow Hand Dug Wells (SHDWs), and in order to sustain access, 
handpumps must be maintained which incurs labour and material costs which are 
priced through the market. In the CBM model, users are required to contribute 
towards the construction of the water source (usually between 5 and 10%); the 
balance is financed by either NGOs or local government. So, in reality construction 
costs are heavily subsidised.  The important underlying assumptions are that monetary 
contributions are affordable, are willingly paid and ultimately engender feelings of 
ownership, which once the scheme is turned over to the community to manage will 
translate into their on-going willingness to pay the full maintenance costs
3
 that are 
crucial for the long-term functionality of the handpumps (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; 
Jones, 2011; Schouten, 2006). A central tenet of the CBM model is that management 
‘service’ provided by the community following turn over of the scheme is voluntary –
– in other words this ‘service’, unlike the physical water, has not been commodified 
and remains outside the market. 
When considering both ideological arms of the CBM model it is assumed that 
collectively they are complementary i.e. that commodification does not distort 
collective action and CPR theory.  Paying for the O&M of the water point in the CBM 
model sets water apart from other CPR resources where financial contributions are 
rarely mandatory. Further, as a resource, drinking water is a special case because of 
the Human Right to water – which compromises Ostrom’s design principle to combat 
free riding through the imposition of graduated sanctions such as denial of access to 
the resource for infringements and habitual non-payment. Drinking water has earned 
itself the label of an ‘uncooperative commodity’ (Bakker, 2003) because of the 
difficulty of reconciling the need to treat it as an economic good with its status as a 
basic Human Right whereby the CPR penalty of exclusion for non-payment is 
socially and ethically impossible to enforce.  
                                                             
3
 Communities are not paying for water per unit consumed, as is common in urban areas (Bakker, 
2003). 
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2.1 Recommendations from the literature to improve the outcomes of community 
managed water points 
Evidence is growing that the high failure rates of communally-managed sources and 
the lack of O&M is due to the dearth of funds to pay for O&M (Jones, 2011; 2013; Le 
Gouais and Wach, 2013; Nabunnya et al., 2012), in conjunction with the waning of 
community interest and a reluctance to volunteer on the WUC (Harvey, 2007; 
Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Quin et al., 2011). View Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Reasons for lack of Operation & Maintenance funds 
Political factors 
 
 Interference of local politicians that advertise for free water in return for votes 
(Carter et al., 2010; Quin et al.., 2011). 
 Lack of legal status and authority of WUC (Harvey, 2007; Lockwood and 
Smits, 2011). 
 
Historical 
factors 
 The general belief among people that water should be free of charge as 
practised during the state-led paradigm, and expectation of external financial 
support by government and NGOs (Jones 2011; Quin et al., 2011; Whittington 
et al., 2009). 
 
Geographical 
factors 
 Alternative water sources reduce people’s willingness to pay for water from 
protected sources (Parry-Jones et al., 2001). 
Social factors  Water users mistrust the WUC due to the fear of mismanagement of funds 
(Harvey et al., 2006; Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2010; Kamruzzaman et al., 
2013; Kleemeier and Narkevic, 2010; Montgomery et al., 2009). 
 Preference of community members is to only pay user fees when the pumps 
breakdown. This actually makes the life of WUC simpler, and community 
members rather spend available money on other projects (Whittington et al., 
2009).  
 WUC not able to efficiently collect water user fees from community members 
(Whittington et al., 2009; Quin et al., 2011). 
 Trained WUC members are not willing to work on a voluntary basis, lack 
access to skills upgrading, forget their initial training, or simply move away 
(Harvey, 2007; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Quin et al., 2011). 
 The enforcement of graduated sanctions for non-payment causes internal 
conflict (Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).  
 
Implementation 
factors 
 Satisfaction and demand of the service (Barnes et al., 2014; Bhandari and 
Grant, 2007; Harvey, 2008; Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2010). 
 Community receives insufficient education about the costs of O&M of the 
water source (Harvey 2008). 
 Promises by implementing organisations that water is free of charge (Carter et 
al., 2010). 
 
 
When project failure occurs, water practitioners predominantly look to three areas 
within the CBM model to improve O&M of rural water points. First, unsuccessful 
water projects are attributed to the lack of community capacity and involvement. The 
solution is sought in improving the design and implementation of participatory 
processes (see Marks & Davis 2012, p. 1575) and through activities aimed at 
enhancing the stock of social capital to increase the sense of obligation to volunteer 
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involvement and deter free-riding (Kähkönen, 1999). Practical capacity building 
activities on maintenance, record-keeping and financial management are also 
recommended. Mandara et al (2013) advocate widening involvement to draw in 
public and private sector professions to train the WUCs and local technicians. 
 
Second, technological solutions are promoted to provide early information about the 
functionality status of handpumps (see Thomson et al., 2012; Hutchings et al., 2012; 
Hope et al., 2011). Recent initiatives such as ‘mobile/water for development’ by 
Oxford University, ‘SweetSense’ by Portland State University and ‘MoMo’ by the 
NGO Welldone, use the mobile phone network for remote monitoring. According to 
Thomson et al (2012) “… analysis of recent historical usage data may provide some 
indication of the nature of the failure and thus speed up the repair cycle” (p.837).   
 
A third set of recommendations to improve the sustainability of handpumps often 
involves the call for external support. Increasingly, both academics and practitioners 
appeal for post-construction support to communities to provide technical expertise 
and advice, administrative and financial support, auditing of accounts, and water 
quality monitoring (Barnes et al., 2014; Baumann and Furey, 2013; Carter et al., 
2010; Carter et al., 1999; Harvey and Reed, 2006; Kamruzzaman et al., 2013; 
Kleemeier, 2010; Lockwood, 2004; Moriarty et al., 2013; Schouten and Moriarty, 
2003). It is noticeable in the literature that there has been a slow retreat from faith in 
full citizen control over the water service: in the 1990s, the absence of post-
construction support meant a sustainable rural water facility because the WUCs were 
functioning and self-regulating (Parry-Jones et al., 2001; Visscher, 1997; Water and 
Sanitation Programme, 2000; Webster et al., 1999). Nowadays post-construction 
support is increasingly brought forward as a pre-condition for sustainability. The most 
logical provider of such support is local government (Koestler et al., 2010). 
Despite increasing criticism about the functioning of the CBM model (Blaikie, 2006; 
Brown, 2013; Carter and Kidega, 2013; Cleaver 1999, 2001; Golooba-Mutebi, 2005; 
Harvey et al., 2006; Harvey and Reed, 2006; Jones, 2011; Koestler et al., 2010; World 
Bank, 2010) the majority of the reviewed literature is optimistic about finding 
solutions within the CBM model, rather than looking outside the paradigm. 
 
 
3. Uganda rural water context 
Uganda, in central East Africa, has an estimated population of 34.8 million (2014), of 
which 85% reside in rural areas (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014). It is expected to 
experience water stress
4
 by 2025, due to the rapid population growth (3.24% in 2014), 
(CIA World Fact Book) and the ongoing degradation of the country’s wetlands that 
regulate the groundwater system (Wong et al., 2005).  
                                                             
4 When demand exceeds available supply or access is restricted due to poor quality. European 
Environment Agency www.eea.europa.eu 
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The legal framework comprises, first, the Local Government Act (1997), revised 
2000, which devolves responsibility for water provision, maintenance and follow-up 
support to local governments; second, the National Water Policy (1999) which 
stipulates that communities need to manage rural water points via a WUC, in 
accordance with the CBM model (view Figure 1) (Ministry of Water and 
Environment Uganda, 2007). The constitution of Uganda (1995), revised 2005, 
acknowledges access to clean water as a right to all Ugandans. Government policy 
was that 77% of the rural population would have access to an improved water point
5
 
by 2015, with 90% functionality of handpumps. 
 
The Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) in 2014 reported 64% 
coverage and 85% functionality. However, it is argued official figures over-report 
functionality (Burr and Fonseca, 2013) as illustrated by the example of Kanungu 
district; officially 78% were functional, whereas the study of Koestler et al (2010) 
report 40%.  
 
 
4. Study site, methods & data collection 
Our study focuses on rural water points in six sub-counties across Masindi and 
Kiryandongo districts in mid-west Uganda (refer to Figure 2). Both districts are 
endowed with surface water and numerous wetlands. Smallholder agriculture is the 
main economic activity in the area (Kavuta and Edriss, 2015).    
 
The objective of the research was to investigate the status of community-managed 
water points with reference to maintenance and financial viability, the functioning of 
WUCs and the effectiveness of collective action, in order ultimately to evaluate the 
CBM model.  To this end questionnaire surveys and interviews were conducted 
between August 2013 and mid-November 2014. This was augmented by ethnographic 
fieldwork by the lead author who resided in Masindi from June 2012 to January 2014 
as the programme manager of a local water, sanitation and hygiene NGO specialising 
in the construction of SHDWs.
6
It is through this organisation that we gained access to 
the 95 sources that form the focus of our study. We were also able to collect data on 
twelve local government constructed sources through our links to local government 
officials.   
 
Two discrete surveys concerning the NGO constructed water points were undertaken 
by NGO staff under the direction of the lead author. The first, with WUC members 
only and representing 84 sources, ascertained information and evidence of O&M fund  
                                                             
5
 Defined as being within 1.5 km and providing a minimum per capita consumption of 20 litres per day. 
6 The covered SHDWs have a depth of five – twelve metres and are fitted with British Consallen 
handpumps, with spare parts on sale at the local NGO office.  
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Figure 1 
Roles of key actors in the CBM model of rural water facilities (adapted from MWE, 2011 p. 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central Government  
 Provide financial and back-up support to Districts  
 Ensure availability of spare parts in the country  
 Policy Regulation and Monitoring 
 Monitor water quality and set standards for O&M 
  Build the capacity of the districts through Technical 
Support Units  
 Conduct studies and Research 
District  
 Financial and Technical Back-up Support to Sub-
County 
 Plan for and co-finance training of Hand Pump 
Mechanics (HPM) Masons and Scheme attendants  
 Provide O& M Tool Kits  
 Supervise sub-counties and the Private sector.  
  Plan and carry out rehabilitation of water facilities 
 Monitor the water quality and O&M  
  Stock spare parts not readily available in the local 
market and sell them to WUCs  
 Enact byelaws/ Ordinances on O&M 
Sub-Country  
 Select/Pay for the training of HPM 
 Train WUC and provide back-up support  
  Supervise and monitor the HPM  
 Provide custody of O&M tool kits  
 Plan and allocate resources to O&M  
 Monitor the functionality of water sources  
 Enact byelaws on O&M 
Water User Committee  
 Plan for and oversee O&M; report problems 
 Together with users select caretakers  
 Engage HPM and pay for spares and repairs  
 Set water user charges, hire and pay caretakers  
 Promote sanitation in the community  
 Make rules and regulations on use of the source 
 Open bank account 
 
Development Partners 
 Financing  
 Technical assistance 
  Studies 
NGO  
 Financing 
 Mobilisation and training  
 Planning and 
implementation 
 Follow-up support 
 Monitoring 
Private Sector 
 Manufacturer/ supply 
and distribute tools and 
spare parts 
 Train HPMs, etc.  
 Maintain and repair 
facilities  
 Manage water facility on 
behalf of community  
 Provide other services as 
required 
Water User Community 
 Participate in planning 
and decision making  
 Elect WUC 
 Participate in site 
section, improving 
sanitation, cleaning 
source surroundings, etc.  
 Make contributions in 
cash/kind to capital and 
O&M costs 
Source Caretaker  
 Organise the community for orderly use  
 Clean surroundings of water facilities  
 Undertake minor service (and repairs)  
 Protect the water catchment area  
 Maintain the fence around the source  
 Collect the O&M funds 
 Well maintained water 
facilities  
 Increased use and 
sustainability 
Direct support  
Information flow 
Outcome 
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collection and WUC activities. The second survey concerned water users at thirteen 
sources. In total 195 respondents were randomly selected and surveyed about sources 
of water, their payment patterns for water use, and attitudes. 
 
95 in depth semi-structured interviews were undertaken with WUC members and 
community users from 30 water sources in seventeen villages (of which twelve 
concerned local Masindi government constructed sources). Interviewees were asked 
to reflect on community relations, household composition and levels of education, 
involvement with the construction phase, satisfaction with the water point; roles and 
responsibilities of the WUC; the payment process of water user fees and O&M 
collection; implementation of graduated sanctions and suggestions for improvement 
of O&M.  
 
As a result of overlap between the surveys and in-depth interviews, a total of 107 
distinct sources were studied, representing a comprehensive data set.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight staff members of the NGO, as 
well as five technical government officials from both sub-county and district level: (1) 
District Water Officer Kiryandongo; (2) Assistant Engineer Kiryandongo; (3) 
Assistant Engineer Masindi; (4) Sub-county chief Kigumba; and (5) Community 
Development Officer Kigumba sub-county. NGO and local government officials were 
asked about the implementation process of a rural water point and to reflect on their 
experiences of post-construction follow-up support and the O&M of rural water 
points.  
 
To calculate the financial sustainability of the studied water points we used the 
WASHCost benchmarks (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). View Table 3 for the estimated 
annual costs of minor and major repairs per technology. 
 
 
5.  Findings 
The implementation stages of our NGO and local government constructed rural water 
points, from inception through to established operation, are presented in this section, 
with particular interest in the post-construction phase.  
 
5.1 Accessing Clean water 
 
In line with the Demand Responsive Approach and Uganda’s rural water policy, each 
village has to demand a SHDW by writing an application letter, signed by the Local 
Councillor (LC) I (the lowest of the five levels of elected local government officials)
 
to the provider (NGO or local government). Depending on size, each village can 
receive multiple protected water sources. In reality the initiative usually comes from 
the NGO, which makes the approach to villages deemed to lack clean water. This is 
because NGOs are under pressure from donors to meet targets.   
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Figure 2 
Map of study area 
 
Table 3 
Breakdown of maintenance expenditures (Adapted from Burr and Fonseca 2013, p. 63.) 
Cost components of 
maintenance 
Estimated costs per SHDW per 
annum 
Estimated costs per deep BH 
per annum 
 Minor maintenance and 
repairs 
Expenditure on labour and 
materials needed for routine 
maintenance  
85,500 UGX (US$ 30) 171,000 UGX (US$ 60) 
 Major maintenance 
Renewal, replacement and 
rehabilitation costs  
256,500 UGX (US$ 90) 342,000 UGX (US$ 120) 
 Total estimated costs per 
annum 
342,000 (US$ 120) 513,000 UGX (US$ 180) 
*US$ 1 = 2850 UGX 
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When initial formalities are complete, a general village meeting is convened. 
According to NGO staff, the attendance varies from village to village: 
“Sometimes you are forced to do spot mobilisation, otherwise there will not be 
enough people” (NGO staff member 29 October 2014).  
An NGO staff member explains the requirements of the project, and to foster a sense 
of ownership, each village has to contribute construction materials or cash (to the 
value of US$ 100). The local government requires a payment of 100,000 UGX (US$ 
35) for a shallow well and 200,000 UGX (US$ 75) for a deep borehole, in the belief 
that upfront monetary contributions demonstrate the community’s willingness to 
maintain the handpump.  
At the meeting, an NGO staff member facilitates the election of a six-strong WUC 
with a woman preferred in the treasurer’s role, because they are locally deemed more 
trust worthy with funds. Occasionally, selected community members refuse to be part 
of the WUC: “Sometimes people argue they are too busy” (NGO staff member 10 
November 2014). 
The NGO remains in contact with a representative from the village to ascertain the 
construction materials are in place, otherwise “people forget about the application” 
(NOG staff member, 12 November 2014). Moreover,  
“[m]aybe one out of the 20 villages would call you back and tell you that they are 
ready” (5 November 2014).  
A suitable site for construction of the SHDW is then selected by technical staff, and 
with the landowner’s consent the agreement to proceed is signed.  
5.2 Construction phase 
 
The NGO requires participation in the construction from a minimum of five 
community members in order to proceed. Weekly checks are carried out on progress 
with the project and with the obligatory construction of pit latrines (not a requirement 
of local government constructed sources). Nine out of 22 construction sites required 
remobilisation between January and October 2014. A site visit where there were no 
delays (Kinyara I Kamugiri, 29 October 2014) revealed that 22 households out of 40 
were unwilling to help in construction, and recently elected WUC members lacked 
commitment necessitating further elections. A NGO staff member said: 
“In most villages we need to push the community members to participate” (10 
November 2014). 
After construction, the NGO trains each WUC for half a day in basic administration 
and bookkeeping, leaving contact details of the Hand Pump Mechanic and price lists 
for spare parts. By contrast, not every water point constructed by the local 
government has a trained WUC, due according the District Water Office to financial 
constraints:   
“Officially, the training for the water point needs to be two days. However, 
facilitation is expensive. We only have a budget of 24,000 UGX per training……If 
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you are there from 10 am in the morning until 4 pm in the afternoon people will ask 
for food and maybe even for facilitation
7” (15 June 2014). 
Only when all households have access to a latrine (which may take over a year) will 
the NGO attach the handle of the handpump. After a warranty period of six months, 
water users are responsible for O&M. It is at this stage that the WUC should convene 
a village meeting with the LC1 to agree on the payment schedule of the water user 
fee, rules of use and sanctions. The local NGO advises communities to pay 1,000 
UGX (US$ 0.35) per month based on predicted maintenance costs for the average 
handpump). Ultimately the decision rests with the WUC, and our study indicates 
considerable variety in the amount and timing of payment.
8
 For the majority of 
studied sources, it was agreed that users should pay the caretaker; in others, payment 
is to be made to the treasurer or chairman.  
Our study revealed that graduated sanctions for non-payment varied from a warning, 
to public shaming, a fine of 1,000 UGX, confiscation of a jerry can to refusal of 
access to the water point. Most sanctions (locally termed byelaws, yet not legally 
binding) were verbally agreed upon during the meeting and not written down. As all 
these arrangements were locally determined for each handpump, in the case of a large 
village with several sources and WUCs, there can be different approaches to fee 
timing and collection, and several different sets of rules and sanctions.  
 
5.3 Post-construction  
Data from our WUC survey and interviews with in total 100 WUCs (graphically 
represented Table 4) revealed that only three water sources (i.e. 3%) had sufficient 
fees to pay for major repairs, and only a further twenty had enough funds for minor 
repairs. The majority – 77 sources – either had insufficient funds for even minor 
repairs (24 sources) or no funds at all – 53 sources.9 
Our study indicated that the long-term sustainability of the majority of the water 
points was at risk due to lack of maintenance funds. “Most [water sources] break 
down because the money is not there” commented the DWO for Kiryandongo 
(August 20, 2013), a view shared by his counterpart for Masindi.  Insufficient funds 
place the communities at risk: for example in Kitengule the handpump broke down 
and had been out of action for a month when visited in August 2013 because the 
WUC did not collect water user fees. Those without access to transport were forced to 
collect water from an open source in the village. 
 
                                                             
7
 The term facilitation is used locally to denote a per diem (covering travel and subsistence) paid to 
local government officials from government budget. This payment has encouraged community 
members to similarly request a “sitting allowance” to compensate their time (Jangeyanga, 2013; GoU, 
2010). 
8 From US$ 0,18 to US$ 0,36 collected per month; to US$ 0,36 to US$ 1,08 collected per quarter; to 
US$ 1,08 to US$ 1,16 per semester; and from US$ 1,80 to US$ 3,60 collected per annum. 
9
 Out of the twelve government funded water sources in the sample of a 100, three water sources had 
funds for minor repairs and nine did not collect funds. 
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Table 4 
Funds available for O&M at 100 water points 
 
 
The reasons behind the precarious funding for O&M, which we have grouped into 
collective action and enforcement of graduated sanctions, are now explored. 
5.3.1 Collective Action 
In the CBM model, collective action is envisaged through (1) the payment of the 
water user fee (2) the participation in public meetings about the water point and (3) 
the voluntary participation of public representatives on the elected WUCs.  
5.3.1.1 Payment of water user fee 
According to the water user survey and interview data, 
10
the collection of the water 
user fee was done in a regular fashion at only five water points out of 40. Irregular 
payment meant that both the water users and the WUC did not structurally adhere to 
the agreed payment scheme. From the water user survey of thirteen water sources 
there was collective irregular payment at three sources, collective non-payment in a 
further three, at six sources there were payment differences amongst users and only at 
one source formally agreed collection rules were realised. 
The study also indicates discrepancies between verbal indications of payment in the 
water user survey and the inspection of register books, which revealed that in reality 
the majority of households in the case study were not paying or only doing so very 
erratically. For example in Kyakamese village, out of 56 households, 30 were 
defaulting or paying irregularly.  
 
We explored whether affordability was an issue in our case study. Aside from a small 
group of listed vulnerable households (widow, elderly and disabled) exempted from 
                                                             
10
 There is an overlap of three between the two data sets.  
3 
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24 
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payment, community members who were not paying admitted: “one cannot fail to pay 
1000 shillings [US$ 0.35] (community member in Kyakamese, 13 June 2014).” 
Nevertheless, several community members raised the timing of payment, particularly 
the period leading up to harvest.  The DWO of Kiryandongo, however, viewed these 
as “just excuses”. He said:  
“One of our biggest diseases in this country is that people want everything for free. 
Just talking and explaining that they should pay for a service is not enough. They 
need some force behind them” (16 June 2014). 
Our research identified seven reasons, which varied by source, why water users were 
not willing to pay the water user fees. The first justification for non-payment was that 
community members felt they had already paid at the construction phase. 
Second, suspicion of the misuse of funds by WUC members was frequently cited. A 
community member in Kihaguzi said: 
“People feel their money will be eaten by the committee members. This feeling of 
being cheated is increased if the handpump is not breaking down for some period. 
Then, people start to wonder where their money is going.” (25 June 2014) 
Suspicion increases when collection is undertaken by several WUC members.  In one 
instance 250,000 UGX (US$ 88) was syphoned off by the treasurer to repair his 
motorbike, with the result that there was no money for repairs when the pump broke 
almost immediately. Understandably the preference of many is to pay at the time of 
breakdown. 
 
The third reason was the availability of other water sources (nearby protected water 
points or open contaminated ponds) where community members were able to collect 
water without paying. Indeed, despite health warnings by the NGO and health 
workers some people preferred the taste of swamp water, and ensuing sickness was 
attributed to witchcraft. 
The households that were willingly paying water user fees were often educated: 
 “These twenty (households who pay) are literate. They have moved.  They are 
educated. They know the importance of clean water” (LC I, Kyarutanga 10 November 
2014). 
The fourth reason for non-payment was the pre-existing tensions between community 
members prior to construction. In Kidwera II, disputes over land and income 
disparities between households contributed to animosities compounded by the refusal 
of more affluent households, who are often elected to the WUC, to subsidise the 
poorer households. The Kyakamese WUC secretary said:  
“People assume that I have more money as I am a teacher, and they expect me to pay for 
them” (13 June 2014). 
   
 
 17 
The result of these tensions is a lack of willingness among community members to 
cooperate:  
“People don’t want to work together. People cannot sit on the same table and discuss 
issues about water” (WUC chairperson of Kidwera II 10 November 2014). 
The fifth reason for non-payment was the expectation of external support by the local 
government or the NGO. Our findings question the assumption that contributing to 
construction would generate a sense of ownership and a feeling of responsibility for 
maintenance. In Kitengule a community member for example said: 
 
“This water source was built by the white men, so why should we pay when the water 
source breaks down?” (10 August 2013). 
 
The sixth explanation was that community members were aware that the WUC or the 
LC1 were not able to enforce the graduated sanctions for non-payment. As we will 
discuss shortly, the WUC or the LCI rarely enforced these byelaws as they could 
create conflicts between households, so free-riding continued without risk of 
punishment. The seventh and last reason for people not to pay the water user fee was 
the realisation that free-riding neighbours were not penalised, encouraging more to 
follow suit i.e a snowball effect. 
5.3.1.2 Community participation in public meetings and public works 
Our interview data uncovered weak community engagement in both public meetings 
about water management, and in public works to keep the water sources clean at the 
majority of water points studied.  Regular public meetings about the water source 
were not convened by the majority of WUCs studied. At Kyarutanga I a WUC 
member explained: 
“Maybe around ten people will come. They feel they are wasting their time” (13 
November 2014).  
In most cases public meetings were only organised at times of breakdown and most 
respondents in the interview data prioritised their livelihood needs above attending 
public meetings: 
“During these WUC meetings, they only talk about paying water user fee. So, why 
should I go to a meeting that is only costing me money?” (Interview community 
member Kidwera II, 10 November 2014). 
 Similarly, for cleaning obligations at the water points. The WUC Chairman of 
Nyakable-Ausonzi said: “Normally they don’t want to work together at the water 
source. They don’t want to clean and respond” (6 August 2013). The treasurer in 
Kyakamese declared:  
“As people are paying they also feel that they should not work at the water source. 
But now the problem is that so many people don’t pay at all” (13 June 2014).  
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However, a variable picture emerges. At four water points (Nyakasakazi, Kihonda-
Nyakachaki, Abira, Kidwere I), the WUC organised regular well-attended community 
meetings.  
5.3.1.3 The voluntary participation of the Water User Committee 
We now identify a range of challenges concerning the functioning of the WUC. 
Collecting the water user fee in most villages was a time-consuming and frustrating 
process, illustrated by the following:  
 “If a person does not want to pay, he will not tell you direct. He will say my child is 
sick. We can go back many times … until there are many times” (WUC member, 
Kyarutanga I 13 November 2014). 
Several interviewed WUC members recounted tales of being regularly threatened 
when they tried to collect water user fees.  The caretakers of sources in Mpumwe and 
Nyakatugo reported that women threatened to bewitch them. Many became resigned 
and ultimately non-confrontational with habitual non-payers. 
However, escalating harassment resulting in WUC members resigning their posts:  
“I stopped to be part of the WUC. There were some people who threatened me to beat 
me up when I asked for money” (Former caretaker Kyarutanga II, 13 November 
2014).  
All the studied WUCs had lost several members, through resignation or migration, 
and none had the specified number. Those that remained often devoted little time to 
their virtually symbolic role, using the voluntary nature of the work as justification, 
which they also used as an excuse to access WUC funds for their personal use: the 
treasurer in Kitengule admitted that other members of the WUC “[c]ome at different 
times to look for money – it gets lost and consumed” (9 August 2013). In Mpumwe, 
the former Chairman of the WUC said:  
“The retired WUC members heard 1,000 shillings [is to be collected]. They thought 
there was some eating, but then they found no money, so no eating. They retreated 
from the committee” (5 August 2013). 
Despite the turnover, at most water points one or two WUC members remained 
active: in Nyakabale-Ausonzi the Chairman admitted that “[b]asically we don’t have a 
committee” – the only active members were himself and the caretaker (6 August 
2013). The DWO of Kiryandongo wryly observed that: “[o]ne person becomes a 
committee” (20 August 2013). The case study NGO tried to reinvigorate inactive 
WUCs or promote the elections of new members. The ‘WUC survey’ showed that 
over a third (35, N=84) of the WUCs were re-elected under the auspices of the NGO 
because they were not carrying out their roles satisfactorily or had resigned. 
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5.3.2 Enforcement of graduated sanctions 
WUCs were not able to enforce even the lower grades of sanctions, such as public 
shaming and confiscation of jerry cans, on community members for non-payment. We 
identify four reasons for the difficulties in enforcing sanctions. First, the WUCs at all 
the water points apart from two (Abira and Kihonda-Nyakachaki) did not know how 
many households were using the water point. From our interviews it was clear 
households used multiple sources, often crossing village borders dependent on 
convenience. Temporary settlers further confused the picture.  
 
Second, the WUC members’ social standing in the community was adversely affected 
by enforcing the byelaw: “[t]his could only bring hatred in the village” (WUC 
member Kidwera 1, 10 November 2014), and in Mboira village:  
 
“People have a negative attitude against the person that enforces the byelaw. You 
become a public enemy” (WUC member, 30 October 2014). 
The threats WUC members received from transgressors, physical or psychological, 
weakened their resolve to enforce the byelaws.  
 
A third reason was the fear of destabilising relationships with relatives and friends.  
For example, at one water point, community members accused the caretaker of failing 
to collect money from his friends. Equally: “[i]t becomes hard to enforce a byelaw on 
your relative” (WUC member Kyarutanga, 30 October 2014). Further: “[w]hat do you 
do if someone pleads with you and tells you he has no money?” (WUC member 
Mpumwe, 19 June 2014). 
 
A fourth reason was the WUCs felt they lacked authority and were not adequately 
supported in their efforts by their village councillor (LC I) who did not want to 
compromise re-election prospects. Recourse to external bodies such as the sub-county 
to follow-up with defaulters was commonly raised. However, an identified problem 
was that government officials usually needed to be paid.
11
A WUC member in 
Kyakamese explains:  
“Maybe I should say the system has really defeated us. If you get an officer from the 
sub-county, you need to give them something to move. Yet, our money is not enough. 
We did it once, but we realised the very people who were helping us were instead 
dwindling our account” (13 June, 2014). 
The only other authority that was left in our case study was the NGO. However, in 
reality it was beyond the scope of the NGO to enforce sanctions: “staff don’t want to 
be the dictator in the village” (NGO staff member, 6 August 2013).  
 
                                                             
11
 Due to government budget shortages, per diems are often not paid so local officials expect 
community members (or NGOs) to cover their per diem. 
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Interestingly, although sanctions on the payment of water user fees were not enforced, 
the majority of the villages did enforce sanctions for non-participation in road works 
in accordance with locally devised and longstanding, yet not legally binding, byelaws. 
“Maintaining the road is done from time immemorial. That is why everyone comes 
and if not, people will come and make you pay or confiscate a goat.” (NGO staff 
member, 5 November 2014). 
Despite this discouraging picture, six water points in four villages in our interview 
data were successful in raising funds for O&M. In the following section we describe 
these cases. 
5.4 Alternative water user fee collection approaches  
Isolated Abira village with one source, with the next nearest water point 3 km away, 
successfully raised adequate water user fees for O&M which were stored on a mobile 
money account. All the households cooperated together as they belonged to the same 
clan (LCI, 11 November 2014). The WUC chairperson (also the LCI) commanded 
respect in the community because he was the grandson of the late king of his tribe and 
the village had a history of enforcing sanctions for non-compliance with rules: 
“[p]eople know the sanctions [for free-riding] and fear to be arrested” (LCI, 11 
November 2014). The three facets of collective action (regular payment, maintaining 
the area around the source, and attending and participating in public meetings) were 
adhered to in this village.  
 
As is the case in Abira, the single water point in Kihonda-Nyakachaki village is 
isolated from other sources (1.5 km away) and has a respected WUC chairperson 
committed to collecting user fees (stored in a bank account) despite harassment:  
“People abuse us… but at the end we get the money” (WUC chairperson, 10 
November 2014). 
The three water points in densely populated Bisenye experience high demand, 
resulting in significant wear and tear on the handpumps which necessitated the 
formulation of rules to govern access and enforcement. The sources were managed by 
caretakers who developed a two-tier annual payment scheme collected in January: 
standard and a priority access “VIP line”. The standard line often meant a lengthy 
queue for water, where as the VIP payers were entitled to go straight to the head of 
the queue (WUC member 12 November 2014). Zealous caretakers were paid out of 
water user fees and enforced shaming misuse sanctions, including public caning. Still 
there were insufficient funds to cover possible major repairs for each water source, 
attendance at community meetings was poor, handpump vandalism took place and 
caretakers were threatened.  
 
An alternative scheme for generating maintenance funds was instigated by an 
entrepreneurial member of the WUC in Kidwera I: he proposed to invest the collected 
meagre 90.000 UGX (US$ 19) in seeds to plant maize on one acre of his family land. 
The community tended the crops, and profits of the harvest (405,000 UGX or US$ 
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131) were stored in a locked money-box held by the initiator of the scheme who was 
locally trusted. In this village, people were willing to work collectively and attended 
community meetings, and the need to collect funds directly was circumvented.  It is 
noteworthy that this strategy was rejected by the adjacent village.  
 
These approaches, which resulted in regular payment and enforcement of sanctions, 
may not be easily replicated in other villages due to unique circumstances such as 
strong leadership, water scarcity, historical patterns, organic organisation and the 
provision of an incentive.  
 
 
6. Discussion  
Despite close attention to CBM good practice (Doe and Khan, 2004) sustainable 
outcomes did not materialise for NGO constructed points, nor for those constructed 
by the government.  In this discussion we suggest that the wings of the CBM model 
individually and collectively are contributing to the multiple failings observed in our 
case study.  
6.1 Problems arising from neo-liberal inspired commodification 
The CBM model expects the beneficiaries of significant capital investments to make a 
monetary contribution (5-10% of total cost) at the outset, and thereafter to continue 
with affordable on-going payment to cover O&M for sustainable access to water (‘the 
goods’). This is the extent to which commodification has been applied under the 
CBM model.  It is assumed that the initial contribution would generate a sense of 
ownership that would instil a commitment to pay indefinitely, a small charge for 
water use – a reasonable enough requirement.  Marks and Davis (2012) demonstrate 
that a sense of ownership and obligation does follow on from an investment – on an 
individual basis – but here we are dealing with the collective where such feelings may 
be diluted. The fact is willingness to pay for maintenance has not materialised in our 
case study.  Just 3% of the surveyed water points (see Table 4) had sufficient funds 
for major repairs, with barely half (47%) collecting any funds at all. This alarming 
failure to secure payment has threatened the long-term functionality of the water 
sources which supports the findings of Burr and Fonseca, 2013 and Jones, 2011. 
There is a firm conviction amongst participants that they have already paid in the 
form of the initial contribution. Moreover, a degree of confusion exists over what the 
water user payment is actually for: groundwater, after all, is untreated and free. What 
is not always fully grasped is that mechanical devices require maintenance and repair, 
and without ready funds, there is likely to be a lengthy interruption to supply, as 
witnessed in Kitengule village.  
 
Commodification necessitates the collection of money from users, and this has proved 
highly damaging to social relations. WUC members have been reluctant to destabilise 
friend and family connections, chase debtors and subject themselves to abuse while 
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carrying out voluntary duties.  This is the point when commodification begins to 
extend from ‘the goods’ to ‘the service’ of water provision.12Those WUC members 
who do not resign (or refuse to become involved in the first place) feel that in many 
cases they deserve recompense in the form of payment for the unpalatable task they 
take on, or failing that, they consider they are justified in abusing funds for personal 
expenditure. A stage further in commodification is the situation where WUCs have 
effectively abandoned attempts to discipline debtors and free-riders and have looked 
for external sanctioning support from local government (sub-county level). The case 
study illustrates that WUCs have effectively been required to pay for this service from 
their collected water user fees. The paying of per diems to already salaried officials is 
a conspicuous example of commodification encroaching on rule enforcement which 
was originally intended to be a voluntary undertaking. The CBM approach is being 
seriously undermined by the relentless, probably irreversible, march of 
commodification.  
 
6.2 CPR theory, grass-roots romanticism and the messy reality 
The CBM model is based on warm and cosy conceptualisations of community 
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Brown 2013). Our case study supports Cleaver’s (2001) 
more nuanced understanding of the term community as “the site of both solidarity and 
conflict, and shifting alliances” (p.45) which we argue impacts on the viability of 
collective action. 
An integral part of CPR theory is the formation of self-regulating institutions whose 
business is to build trust and norms of reciprocity, and more specifically to devise 
appropriate rules of usage and enforce sanctions on those who break them in order to 
ensure the sustainability of an undertaking. It is key to recognise that successful cases 
of CPR management, as documented by Ostrom (1990), mostly arose organically and 
were independently organised. The rural water projects were neither: they were 
government policy and communities have never been organised around water, so no 
set of long standing customs and traditional penalties are in place.
13
 
Despite the full range of participatory strategies put in place by the implementing 
NGO, water users were disinclined to attend public meetings or volunteer their 
services for the upkeep of the water point, which supports the findings of Harvey 
(2007), Lockwood and Smits(2011) and Quin et al.(2011). Further, continuous 
pressurising and motivating by the NGO implementer became necessary and 
ironically, their well-intentioned presence may weaken feelings of responsibility for 
the handpumps. Villages often have multiple water sources, so in reality users can 
avail themselves of alternatives, which further erodes a sense of loyalty to a particular 
water point. 
                                                             
12Even in villages where caretakers were formally paid for their services, such as Bisenye, it did not 
guarantee that sufficient funds for maintenance were collected. 
13 In the case study, two villages, Kidwera I and Bisenye, independently devised alternative approaches 
to generate maintenance funds that matched the needs in their locality.  
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Fundamental to CPR theory is that households eligible to use the source are clearly 
defined, but people bounded in the same geographical area are not static (Guijt and 
Shah 1998) as our case study indicates. The messy reality is that WUCs did not know 
which households used a particular water point due to migration, short-term residency 
or the practice of using multiple water sources within and across village borders. 
Domestic water also differs from other CPR schemes because payment for use is 
involved, and because it is a basic Human Right it has proved morally difficult to 
deny access. This lack of clarity had repercussions for payment and the imposition of 
sanctions, and fundamentally contravenes Ostrom’s first design principle ‘clearly 
defined boundaries’. The fact that byelaws are verbal and differ for each point is also 
unhelpful.  
 
In addition to overseeing rotas for cleaning and opening and locking the pumps, 
WUCs are tasked with collecting money from reluctant contributors and enforcing 
discipline for failure to pay. This is where the neo-liberal paradigm and 
commodification of water (‘the goods’) has sullied14 the potential of collective action 
and has become socially divisive, often exacerbating pre-existing tensions. The 
potential to access the collected fees has proved corrupting in some instances. In 
collectively managed schemes, the lines of responsibility and accountability to users, 
particularly in relation to fee collection, become blurred, as our case study 
exemplifies. Mistrust of WUC members over money, often justified, has in many 
cases undermined collective action.  
 
As a result of embedded social networks and fractured relations in the villages, the 
real situation is that WUCs have no authority, and their self-regulating status is 
negated once calls to local government are made. Ultimately, WUCs have been 
unwilling and unable to uphold the system, and constant re-election and re-
invigoration by NGOs has had little impact.  Citizens are aware that sanctions cannot 
be enforced on water access, thus contravening CPR theory. Non-payment has 
become a rational choice and the norm, and has fatally undermined the CBM model.  
 
The two wings of the CBM model do not work comfortably together, and both have 
relied heavily on assumptions about human behaviour, which we argue do not bear 
out in the Ugandan or wider contexts (Brown, 2011; Cleaver, 1999). CPR theory does 
not reflect messy rural realities, and payment for water compounds social tensions and 
undermines the potential for sustainable collective action.  
 
6.3 Evaluating the recommendations in the existing literature 
While it is increasingly recognised there are difficulties with the CBM approach, 
attempts to address failings tend to focus on shoring up the CBM paradigm and can be 
                                                             
14 Harvey (1996), building on Freud, graphically reminds us of the corrupting influence of money and 
its association with filth. 
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grouped under three categories: increasing social capital, via technology, and via 
external help. The question under review is whether these approaches are likely to 
increase involvement and willingness to pay?  
 
The advocates of community management set great store by investing in and 
increasing the stock of social capital via participation and capacity building, but this is 
an open ended, ever-extendable and expensive endeavour requiring trained and 
funded facilitators. Whether the sustainability of CBM can be improved in this way is 
questionable. Our findings indicate that problems arising from the voluntary status of 
WUCs, the availability of alternative sources, and the reluctance to enforce sanctions 
on family and friends are unlikely to be resolved by such expenditure of time and 
money, nor is it likely to stimulate a willingness to pay.  
 
The case study demonstrated the lengths to which the NGO went in motivating the 
application process, getting the participatory process right and reinvigorating failing 
WUCs. Our interpretation is that there is very little more that they could have done.  
 
There was scant evidence that the NGO efforts resulted in social cohesion because 
deep-seated divisions based on wealth and education are not easily bridged by 
tweaking participatory processes (Brown, 2014). Our findings suggest first, that the 
constant intervention by the NGO may be eroding the sense of local connection and 
thus responsibility to the project. Second, and perversely, that pockets of close social 
relations involving friends and family members of the WUC may actually inhibit the 
collection of fees and enforcement of rules. Thus ironically, attempts to increase the 
stock of social capital in these villages as frequently suggested (Bisung and Elliott, 
2014) may only exacerbate these problems.We acknowledge that there is value in 
practical training in skills such as record keeping, financial management and 
knowledge about water-borne diseases, but such training would need to be paid for, 
and attendance cannot be guaranteed.  
 
There is a belief in some quarters that technological solutions such as sensors to 
predict imminent breakdown and communicate failure to mechanics will reduce 
downtime (Hope et al., 2011; Hutchings et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2012). While we 
do not pass judgement on the merits of these innovations (de Laet and Mol, 2000), the 
cost of retrofitting the handpumps is significant and at bottom we do not think that the 
lack of information about the functioning of a handpump is the limiting factor behind 
low levels of payment, or enforcement of sanctions.  
 
In the literature (Barnes et al., 2014; Baumann and Furey, 2013; Carter et al., 2010; 
Harvey and Reed, 2006; Kamruzzaman et al., 2013; Kleemeier, 2010;  Lockwood, 
2004; Moriarty et al., 2013; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003)  and in the communities 
studied there were calls for external support to enhance sustainability.  We noted in 
the literature review post-construction support has become pre-requisite in project 
   
 
 25 
planning.
15
 While Koestler et al. (2010) advocate local government as the logical 
provider of external support, the lack of funds and capacity (Day, 2011; Kleemeier, 
2010) and the cloud of corruption (Blundo and Le Meur, 2009) are an obstacle to this 
route, and capacity building of local government itself is considered vital (Quin et al., 
2011).We argue the calls from both academics and community members for external 
support are a strong signal that the model is not working. Many of the WUCs 
recognised they were not self-regulating institutions because they were unable to raise 
the necessary funds and enforce sanctions.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The solution to the effective maintenance of handpumps is proving a formidable 
challenge, and central to achieving the sixth post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal 
are questions over who should finance the running costs of rural water points. It has 
been demonstrated conceptually and empirically that there are problems with 
commodification and within grassroots approaches, and collectively the CBM model 
is undermined once the voluntary service of the WUC moves towards 
commodification. Reforms within the CBM paradigm do not offer any guarantee of 
improved outcomes – they do not overcome the central failings of willingness to pay 
and to participate. In sum the CBM model has turned out to be a blueprint for 
breakdown.  
It seems we are at a crossroads in rural water delivery and need to look squarely at the 
question: can communities be financially responsible for maintenance, and should 
they be responsible? The impression from extensive fieldwork is that there is little 
appetite for it: there is no evidence that communities want full citizen control 
(Golooba-mutebi, 2005).  
Will academics, policy makers and practitioners be open to explore alternatives that 
go beyond the CBM paradigm? A return to the state-led paradigm and cross 
subsidisation (Swyngedouw, 2006), despite its history of poor provision, may be 
ideologically appealing to some. Advancing self-supply such as rain water harvesting 
is another option that has been advocated (MWE, 2011). Finally, the growing trend 
towards commodification may point in the direction of privately managed rural water 
points (Carter and Kidega, 2013; Harvey, 2008; Harvey et al., 2006; World Bank, 
2010). These are possibilities we explore in subsequent papers, for we firmly believe 
that until there is a resolution to financing handpump maintenance, the sixth post-
2015 Sustainable Development Goal is but a mirage. 
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